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Abstract:  In  this  paper  I  claim that  perceptual  discriminatory  skills  rely  on  a  suitable  type  of
environment  as  an  enabling  condition  for  their  exercise.  This  is  because  of  the  constitutive
connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection
is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge
of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical
knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by becoming
sensitized to its affordances. I call this position ecological disjunctivism. A corollary of this position
is that a case of perception and its corresponding case of hallucination—which is similar to the
former  only  in  some respects—are  different  in  nature.  I  show then  how the  distinguishability
problem is addressed by ecological disjunctivism. 
Keywords:  Discriminatory skills;  ecological approach to perception; disjunctivism;  affordances;
practical knowledge. 
1. Introduction
Gibson ended his paper “New Reasons for Realism”, published in  Synthese, with a plea for help
(1967, p. 172). He asked us to join him in the task of figuring out the epistemological consequences
of his then new ecological view of perception. Responding to this call, I claim that disjunctivism
and the ecological view of perception fit each other.1 The ecological view of perception is good for
1 In the same vein, La Favela and Chemero (2016) put forward an ecological account of visual illusions in support of
a direct theory of perception. However, they do not seem to agree that disjunctivism and ecological psychology can
form a good match. They suggest that disjunctivists “often engage in debates that discuss perception in traditional
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disjunctivism in providing a response to Tyler Burge’s objection that disjunctivism is incompatible
with  science  (2011,  p.  43).2 Disjunctivism is  not  only  compatible  with  but  also  supported  by
ecological psychology. The ecological view also helps disjunctivism to explain why an episode of
perception and its corresponding episode of hallucination are different in nature. Due to the way an
organism becomes sensitized to its environment, the perceptual skills of the organism can only be
exercised  in  their  proper  environment.  Whatever  the  response  of  the  organism in  an  improper
environment, it’s not the outcome of the exercise of a perceptual skill or ability. As I will show, this
ecological  construal  of  perceptual  skills  helps  disjunctivism to  deal  with  the  distinguishability
problem. The problem here is that even if an episode of perception and its corresponding episode of
hallucination are different in nature, as claimed by disjunctivists, this difference is not enough to
explain how one can know that they are perceiving, rather than hallucinating—particularly if these
episodes are indistinguishable from the first-person perspective. In the other direction, disjunctivism
is  good  for  ecological  psychology  in  providing  an  epistemological  framework  within  which
Gibson’s claim that “perceiving is the simplest and best kind of knowing” (Gibson 2015, p. 251) can
terms” (2016, p. 71) and that ecological psychologist does not need to appeal to “disjunctive contents to explain”
hallucinations  (2016,  p.  77).  But  the  ecological  psychologist  appeals  to  disjunctive  principles  to  explain
hallucinations (2016, p. 71-72) and this precise point can be embedded in a disjunctive account of experience.
Besides,  as  I  will  argue  in  Section  4,  the  ecological  view of  perception  can  benefit  from a  partnership  with
disjunctivism. Another interesting work that follows the same trajectory as this study is Beaton’s (2016) proposal to
read the sensorimotor theory of perception as a form of direct realism. There are relevant similarities between his
results and those I advance in this paper, although we draw on different resources and take different paths. The
present work may be seen as complementary in some respects to Beaton’s work. He also claims that his position is
both disjunctivist  and direct  realist  (2016,  p.  265).  However,  while  he stresses  the  direct  realist  aspect  of  his
position,  I  stress  the  disjunctivist  aspect.  We  both  sustain  not  only  that  an  episode  of  perception  and  its
corresponding episode of hallucination are different in nature but also that, given the proper circumstances, one can
know whether one is perceiving or not. However, we have different approaches to introspection. He, relying on
Shoemaker’s  work  on  introspection,  maintains  that  one  can  have  propositional  knowledge  of  whether  one  is
perceiving, while I, relying on ecological resources, maintain that one can have second-order practical knowledge
of one’s perceptual episodes. Another component of our works that is complementary is the attention I give to how
the ecological approach to perception helps to clarify the notion of skill that underpins disjunctivism—at least the
version I advocate—while Beaton gives more attention to how direct realism helps to clarify the philosophical
consequences of the sensorimotor theory of perception.
2 According  to  Burge,  the  science  of  perception  explains  episodes  of  perception  and  episodes  of  illusion  or
hallucination based on a common factor.  The same “quasi-deterministic laws between registration of proximal
stimulation  an  the  perceptual  states”  (2011,  p.  44)  explain  how  someone  comes  to  have  a  perceptual  or  a
hallucinatory state. The differences between theses states are due to distal inputs, “the causal chains that lead from
the environment to the same registration of proximal stimulation.” (2011, p. 44) As, according to science, the same
mechanism explains the occurrence of an episode of perception and an episode of hallucination, disjunctivism must
be wrong since it rejects this fundamental and explanatory common factor. However, as I will show later, episodes
of perception and of hallucination are not to be explained by the same principles or laws according to ecological
psychology. Thus, Burge is wrong in rejecting disjunctivism only because of his restricted diet of sciences. 
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be explained. By construing perceptual abilities as skills of access (Noë 2015, p. 1) or as capacities
that provides us openness to the world (McDowell 1996, p. 111), we can explain why the process of
picking up information in the environment provides us cognitive contact with (Millar 2007, p. 176)
and therefore knowledge of the world. 
In the next section I will outline Gibson’s ecological approach to perception. Then, in Section 3, I
argue that a discriminatory skill, as understood from an ecological approach, can only be exercised
in its proper environment. In Section 4, I argue that this conception of discriminatory skills fits with
a disjunctivist view of perception. Finally, in the last Section, I show how the proposed view deals
with the distinguishability problem.
2. The ecological approach to perception
It has always been assumed that the senses were channels of sensation. To consider them as a system
of perception, as this book proposes to do, may sound strange. But the fact is that there are two
different meanings of the verb to sense, first, to detect something, and second, to have a sensation.
When the senses are considered as perceptual systems the first meaning of the term is being used.
(Gibson 1968, p. 1)
The ecological  approach to  perception  is  far  from being dominant  in  the  field  of  psychology;
however, it has been receiving attention again with the emergence of the enactive and embodied
views  of  the  mind.3 These  are  all  related  theories  that  propose  to  construe  cognition  not  as
something that happens only inside our brains but as involving constitutively the interactions of the
organism with its  environment  and as giving a  fundamental  role  to  its  body in organizing and
structuring the perceptible world. According to Gibson’s approach, perception does not boil down to
3 For a more detailed discussion of the relation between the ecological approach and the enactive and embodied
views of the mind, see Chemero (2009, pp. 17–44),  Rowlands (2010, pp. 33–37), and Hutto and Myin (2017,
second chapter).
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sensations, nor it can be taken as a mental process of interpreting or adding something to sensations.
Indeed, sensations are incidental to perception, “detecting something can sometimes occur without
the accompaniment of sense impressions” (Gibson 1968, p. 2). Perception, rather, is the direct pick-
up of environmental information for the control of behavior. It is not passive as sensations are;
rather, it is the result of the employment of a system whose main function is to seek and extract
information about the environment from the optical, mechanical, or chemical energy. Some of that
information, as the size constancy of an object (about which I will say something later), is scattered
in the environment and can only be picked up over time while the organism moves through its
environment. Perception, therefore, must be construed as a system or, as I would prefer to say, a set
of  skills  or  abilities  for  the  detection  and  discrimination  of  information  available  in  the
environment, skills whose employment normally takes time and requires the movement of the eyes,
head, or body. The eye itself, for instance, is not the organ of vision; it “is part of a dual organ, one
of a pair of mobile eyes, and they are set in a head that can turn, attached to a body that can move
from place to place” (Gibson 2015, p. 47). All these elements working together for the purpose of
picking up environmental information constitute a perceptual system.
The  distinction  between  stimulation  and  stimulus  information,  which  is  closely  related  to  the
distinction above between defining the senses as channels of sensations or as perceptual systems, is
significant for the ecological approach. Receptors are stimulated when they absorb an amount of
energy above a certain threshold. Stimulation is a passive process. The traditional view of perception
posits that punctate and momentary stimulation and the corresponding sensation comprise the basis
of perception (Gibson 2015, p. 47). Because this sensory input “carries no information about its
source in the world; that is, it does not specify its source,” (2015, p. 50) perception is understood as a
creative process of embellishing the meager input of stimuli. Memories or background knowledge,
whether learned or innate, must contribute to perception in some way. The ecological approach is
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founded upon a quite different assumption. When energy—such as mechanical, optical, or chemical
—in space and/or in time is sufficiently structured to specify its source, then it carries information
about its source. Information, for Gibson, “means information about, or specification of” (1968, p.
187). One thing specifies another if the former is univocally related to the latter by virtue of physical
laws (Gibson 1968, p. 187).4 Now, if we assume that the basis of perception is not a momentary
stimulus but a changing flow of stimulation, then the function of perception is to pick up information
that is carried by the structured flow of stimulation and yielded by certain interactions between the
organism and  structured  energy  in  its  environment.  To  pick  up  such  information  is  to  directly
perceive the source specified by that information; this process does not require the intervention of
memories, representations, or inferences (Gibson 2015, p. 139; Michaels and Carello 1981, p. 2).
This process is active since the organism needs to move and adjust its sense organs in order to have a
structured flow of stimulation that carries ambient information. Perceptual systems control the flow
of stimulation in order to resonate to ambient information.
To understand how energy can be structured,  consider the case of optical energy. Each point of
observation receives rays coming from different directions with different intensities depending on the
surfaces that reflected them. Gibson calls a point like this one ambient light, because it comprehends
all the rays of light coming from the surrounding ambient, and he contrasts this kind of light with
radiant light, a singular ray of light that departs from a point, by reflection or by being an original
source  of  light.  Radiant  light  contains  no  information  about  its  source,5 whereas  ambient  light
4 Gibson’s notion of  information as a  relation of specification must not be confused with Shannon’s concept of
information (Gibson 2015, p. 232; 1968, p.  245).  Whether the relation of specification depends necessarily on
natural laws has long been debated. This claim seems to be defended by Gibson, as well as Turvey, Shaw, Reed and
Mace (Turvey et  al.  1981).  Chemero, however,  claims that  strong regularities  underpinned by conventions are
enough (2009, pp. 116–120). See Heras-Escribano & Pinedo (2016) for criticism of this position. More recently,
Bruineberg, Chemero and Rietveld distinguish between lawful information and general ecological information. The
latter  is  “any  regularity  in  the  ecological  niche  between  aspects  of  the  environment,  x  and  y,  such  that  the
occurrence of aspect x makes the occurrence of aspect y likely” (Bruineberg et al. 2018, p. 7). In this paper I will
utilize the definition of lawful information.
5 If this is the kind of light available to sight, then it is not surprising that it has been argued that distance is not given
to us directly by vision but must be inferred. No ray of light contains information about how far it has traveled. See
Smith’s reconstruction of the Berkeley discussion about this point (Smith 2000, pp. 488–490).
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contains information about the reflecting surfaces due to the differences of intensity among the rays
coming from different directions. If one surface in the ambient is changed, the ambient light in that
environment  changes  as  well,  so  the  structure  of  ambient  light  specifies  something  in  the
environment (Gibson 2015, p. 45).6 Coal, for instance, modulates light in a particular way due to “its
irregular, multifaceted, achromatic, and absorbent surface” (Michaels and Carello 1981, p. 25). Thus,
the ambient light in an environment with coal is structured characteristically. That light is a structure
that specifies coal and, therefore, carries environmental information about coal.
Energy patterns  that  are  uniquely and invariantly  tied to  their  sources  in  the environment  carry
information about the environment.  The concept of invariant is crucial  to understanding how an
organism detects environmental information. For Gibson, the optic flux, as well as the mechanical,
acoustic, and chemical fluxes, may reflect a lot of high-order information stored in the environment
inasmuch as what is invariant, and therefore specify some lasting object or property, is revealed as
such by changing what is inessential.7 In fact, “invariants are, quite simply, properties that tolerate
certain transformations without changing” (Michaels and Carello 1981, p. 40). Thus, in many cases,
“what  is  invariant  does  not  emerge unequivocally except  with  a  flux” (Gibson 2015,  p.  66).  A
considerable amount  of Gibson’s work was dedicated to identifying the invariants stored in  the
environment.  For  example,  in  order  to  explain  the  perception  of  size  constancy,  traditional
approaches assume that the perceptual system infers the real size of an object from its apparent size
and its distance from the beholder. Those approaches must then explain how the information about
the distance is initially obtained. Gibson’s approach, however, requires no inferences. He claims that
the information about the size constancy of an object is present in the environment, at least in an
6 These differences are necessary for  the ambient  light  to contain information. In  some situations,  as when the
environment is filled with dense fog, the ambient light is not structured, as at any point the rays coming from
different directions have the same intensity. In this environment, no changes in a surrounding surface would have
any impact on the ambient light. For Gibson, as nothing can be discriminated in this scenario with the help of the
ambient light, this situation is a case in which sensation is not sufficient for perception (Gibson 2015, pp. 46–47).
7 Invariants that specify lasting entities are also referred to as structural invariants. However, there are also invariants
for  events—invariants that  specify a style of  change.  These invariants are also referred to  as  transformational
invariants. For a detailed discussion of these types of invariants, see Michaels and Carello (1981, p. 25-30).
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environment with a ground like ours, and can be directly picked up by a moving organism. He points
out  that  in  our  environment  “the rule  of equal  amounts  of texture for equal  amounts  of terrain
remains invariant” (Gibson 2015, p. 156); that is, an object close or far away from the perceiver
occludes the same amount of terrain. The more distant an object is from the perceiver, the denser the
texture of the terrain and of the object, but the relation between the object resting on the ground and
the amount of ground texture that the former occludes remains the same. That invariant can be
picked up by an organism while it approaches to or recedes from the object; as Gibson says, “the
dimensions of things on the ground are perceived directly” (Gibson 2015, p. 160–161). 
We  are  now  in  a  better  position  to  appreciate  Gibson’s  view  of  perception  as  a  system  for
discriminating or detecting things, properties, or events in the environment. As has already been
pointed out, Gibson suggests a different starting point for thinking about the function of perception.
What if, instead of the meager sensory input assumed by the traditional approach to perception, “the
flux of stimulation at receptors does yield all the information anyone needs about the environment?”
(Gibson and Gibson 1955, p. 34). Those systems may then be considered as discriminatory processes
whose main function is to pick up the information available in such a flux. This is something the
organism usually learns to do, although it may already be attuned to some specific environmental
information through evolutionary processes (Michaels and Carello 1981, p. 79). An organism learns
to  perceive  insofar  as  it  learns  to  discriminate  invariants  present  in  its  environment;  perceptual
learning, Jerome Gibson and Eleanor Gibson claim, “consists of responding to variables of physical
stimulation not previously responded to” (Gibson and Gibson 1955, p. 34). Thus, they propose that
the general function of the perceptual systems is to yield patterned specialized responses to specific
invariants. These responses can be taken, I suggest, as specific discriminatory skills or abilities. As
Gibson points out, “perceptual systems develop perceptual skills” (Gibson 1968, p. 51).8 
8 It’s worthwhile to mention that the ecological approach to perception is suitable to handle sensory substitution. This
is  because  the  aim of perceptual  systems is  to  detect  energy  patterns.  Informational  structures,  not  sensations
themselves, are meaningful. Thus, an optic pattern that is normally picked up by the visual system may also be
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3. Discriminatory skills and environment
The view that discriminatory skills can only be exercised in a proper environment still needs to be
examined. Some of Gibson’s comments may be developed to back up a conception of these skills as
having a constitutive connection to the environment in which they were raised by an evolutionary or
learning process. Because of how this connection is construed from an ecological approach, I submit
that a discriminatory skill is exercised only in its proper environment; otherwise what we have is
nothing more  than  a  failed  attempt to  exercise  that  skill.  Besides,  there  is  no such thing  as  an
unsuccessful exercise of a discriminatory skill. I will argue that there is a coherent and defensible
sense in which it is right to say that If a discriminatory skill is exercised at all, then it is successful in
picking up a particular. Three claims back up that proposal: (i) Invariants themselves are dependent
on the environment; (ii)  We pick up an invariant by perceiving affordances, which are relations
between the organism and its environment; and (iii) Discriminatory skills are always a matter “of
getting [dynamically] in closer touch with the environment” (Gibson and Gibson 1955, p. 34) over
time. Let us unpack those claims one at a time. 
3.1. Invariants are environment-dependent
It is important to emphasize that invariants are normally dependent on the environment; they specify
features of an object or aspects of an event in a specific environment and cannot be understood in
abstraction  from  that  environment.  The  size  constancy  invariant,  for  instance,  requires  an
environment with a ground—it does not even exist in the optic array in open air.9 Another example is
the  ability  of  sharks  to  electrically  detect  food,  such as  a  flatfish.  Edible  organisms  produce  a
bioelectric  field  that  is  “partially  modulated  in  the  rhythm  of  the  living  thing's  respiratory
picked up by the haptic system provided that it is first converted into a haptic pattern. For further discussion on this
point, see Favela et al. (2018).
9 Gibson reported that it can be very disorienting for an airplane pilot to fly through clouds if there is no way to see
the ground. Even when there is some visibility, if the ground is out of sight, the pilot’s acuity in perceiving size
constancy is impaired (Gibson 2015, pp. xviii, 153).
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movements”  (Turvey  et  al.  1981,  p.  276).  Thus,  a  shark  can  discriminate  an  edible  thing  by
discriminating a certain type of bioelectric field. This is possible only because “in the niche of the
shark ‘an edible thing’ and ‘electric field of, say, type F’ are nomically related” (Turvey et al. 1981,
p. 277). The invariant that specifies edible things is dependent on a specific type of environment: the
niche of the shark. This point has repercussions for how we should conceive discriminatory skills. It
is to be expected that a discriminatory skill that has the function to pick up an invariant is able to do
so at least in the environment that supports that invariant. An organism able to discriminate the size
constancy of objects while it remains on the ground is not supposed to do so in situations in which
the ground is not present or visible, because information on size constancy is not available in these
situations. The main point here as to how discriminatory skills should be conceived is that, at least in
environments in which an invariant is available, a discriminatory skill must be able to systematically
pick up that invariant for it to be the case that it has the function to discriminate that invariant. Thus,
there should be a systematic link between the exercise of a discriminatory skill in a certain type of
environment and its success in picking up an invariant in that environment.
Such systematic links between the exercise of a discriminatory skill in a certain type of environment
and its success in picking up an invariant is not enough to sustain that that discriminatory skill could
not be exercised in another type of environment, even unsuccessfully. We must therefore unpack the
second claim. The claim about  the perception of an invariant through its  affordances should be
construed  in  the  context  of  Gibson’s  understanding  of  perceptual  systems  for  the  control  of
behavior.10 According to Gibson, if we take seriously the idea that deliverances of perception should
be useful for the control of behavior, then it is reasonable to assume the hypothesis that invariants are
10 This proposal should not be confused with the behaviorist idea that perception is reduced to a kind of performative
behavior. An organism can perceive the size of a tomato before moving to a position in which the back of the
tomato is put in view. Gibson’s point is that the function of the perceptual systems—the pickup of invariants in the
environment—is subordinate to the function of the performative and orienting systems (Gibson 2015, p. 234); that
is, to the organism’s control of its actions for achieving its needs and plans. However, at the same time, is true that
some kinds of behavior serve perception. Adjustments of the eye, head, and body, movements, and probings are all
encompassed by an exploratory system that is subordinate to perception (Gibson 1968, p. 57; Gibson 2015, p. 234).
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picked up or perceived in terms of affordances, that is, possibilities for action. As he puts it, “to
perceive something is also to perceive how to approach it and what to do about it.” (Gibson 2015, p.
216).
3.2. Affordances are relational in nature
Affordances are resources in the environment that offer opportunities for behavior; for instance, a
trunk knee-high above the ground offers to me the opportunity for sitting on it.  An object with
opposing sides that are less than a handspan apart affords grasping. These two examples illustrate an
important point about affordances: they cannot be specified without reference to the organism. As
Gibson says, “an affordance…points two ways, to the environment and to the observer” (Gibson
2015, p. 132). Affordances are relational in nature. In both cases, what the object affords depends on
the features of the object. Whether an object is graspable depends on its width. Whether a surface
can be sat upon depends on its height. At the same time, it depends on the organism as well. An
object that is graspable by me does not necessarily afford grasping for a child; the same applies to
objects  that  afford  sitting  on  for  me.  Affordances  are  relative  to  possibilities  for  action,  and it
happens  that  I  and  a  child  have  different  sets  of  possibilities  for  action.  However,  there  is  no
consensus among ecological psychologists regarding what in the organism underpins the possibilities
for  action.  The  options  range  from  body  properties  (Warren  1984),  to  dispositional  properties
(Turvey 1992), to abilities (Chemero 2003). Here I will follow Chemero in claiming that affordances
are relations between features of the environment and abilities of the organism. Thus, in order to
perceive a trunk as affording the opportunity to sit on it, the organism must actually be able to sit on
the trunk—it must have the proper ability to do so. That the body of an organism in virtue of its
flexibility can be put in the right position of being seated is not enough. 
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In this  reading of Gibson’s account  of  perception,  abilities  are  important  because they help the
organism to track, explore, and pick up invariants. In fact, the perceptual system of an organism does
not construct general and context-free representations of these invariants, but instead  resonates to
them (Gibson 1968, pp. 269–271) or is attuned to them (Gibson 2015, p. 238). Gibson uses that radio
metaphor to call attention to the exploratory activity and continuous attunement of the organism to
its environment in the process of picking up invariants. The emphasis on affordances also clarifies
this  point.  For  instance,  imagine  a  very  tired  human  being  walking  in  a  park.  This  person  is
approaching something that might be a trunk, but the invariants specifying its shape have not yet
been picked up by the person’s perceptual system, only part of them. The person then approaches the
trunk in a way that discloses its height and shape. Because the person is tired, he or she is prepared to
sit; that is, the person’s ability to sit is ready to be exercised, the muscles of the back and legs are
tensed in such a way that the person feels as if his or her body were soliciting him or her to sit on the
trunk and rest. Besides, the person’s ability partially shapes the way he or she approaches towards
the trunk by helping the perceptual system track and explore the height and the shape of the trunk in
relation to those parts of the body that are relevant to the action of sitting. If the person were engaged
in a different activity—for instance, if he or she were running and trying to jump over trunks—then a
different set of abilities would be in play; that trunk would be explored and approached in a different
way, and its height and shape would be picked up in terms of other parts of the body. The affordance
of sitting on and the affordance of jumping over refer to different relations between the trunk and the
individual in question, because the possibilities for the action involved in each case are not the same.
Which affordance is solicited and perceived in a given moment depends on the activity in which the
organism is engaged and consequently on the abilities it brings to bear on the situation. 
From the  considerations  above,  two  reasons  can  be  given  as  to  why  a  proper  environment  is
necessary for the exercise of a discriminatory skill. First, if we perceive affordances, and affordances
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are  relations  between the  environment  and the  organism,  then  the  proper  environment  must  be
present  for  that  relation to  be perceived.  A relation  cannot  exist  without  its  relata.  Second,  the
abilities  of  the  organism  that  underpin  its  possibilities  for  actions  are  in  play  in  an  ongoing
exploratory  process  by  which  the  perceptual  system  of  the  organism  tracks  invariants  in  the
surrounding environment. Insofar as these exploratory interactions make up part of the perceptual
process,  keeping  the  organism in  contact  with  its  surrounding environment,  it  can  be  said  that
perception cannot occur unless the organism finds itself in the proper environment to pick up the
invariant that has been just explored.
It seems that once we have accepted Gibson’s active account of perception, it  is difficult not to
acknowledge  the  fundamental  role  that  the  environment  plays  in  perception.  However,  the  two
reasons given above for taking a proper environment as necessary for exercising discriminatory skills
could  be  overridden  by  the  following  objections.  First,  even  though  affordances  are  relations
between the environment and the organism and they cannot exist without their relata, it does not
follow from that that affordances are perceived whenever the perceptual system finishes a process of
perception. If it is possible to “perceive” an illusory affordance, then it would be possible to exercise
a discriminatory skill without being in the proper environment. Second, even though the exploratory
activity of a perceptual system keeps the organism attuned to its environment, nothing of what has
been said about this activity implies that it could not be bypassed by the perceptual system, yielding
a perception without the help of that exploratory activity. Again, one could “perceive” an illusory
affordance, and the same consequence as before follows.
3.3. The radio metaphor and perception as the act of picking up information
In order to respond to these worries, it may be stressed that Gibson’s approach is committed to a
stronger claim, namely, that exploratory activity is not only a possible part of the perceptual process
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but a necessary and constitutive one as well. Once we have a proper understanding of the role that
the third claim (iii) plays in his account of perception, we can dismiss the objections above. The third
claim is necessary to connect Gibson’s characterization of the general function of perceptual system
as  “a  discriminative  process”  (Gibson  and  Gibson  1955,  p.  34)  with  his  characterization  of  a
particular act of perceiving as “the act of picking up information” (Gibson 2015, p. 229). In other
words, we need to understand how an organism acquires discriminatory skills through which it can
pick up invariants. 
Discrimination is not to be understood as a process of singling something out based on sensations;
instead,  it  is based on affordances—that is,  an object is  discriminated from others based on the
possibilities for action it offers from the perspective occupied by the organism. Exploratory activities
and “adjustments of the perceptual organs” (Gibson 1967, p. 163) are not optional; they constitute
discrimination. The radio metaphor is again relevant. These activities keep the organism attuned to
an object while disclosing its affordances. Over time, they are necessary and sufficient for bringing
about invariants in the flow of stimulation. Thus, the third claim establishes a constitutive connection
between exploratory activities and discriminatory skills. As Gibson claims, “the process of pickup
involves … overt movements that can be measured, such as orienting, exploring, and adjusting”
(2015, p. 251). These activities in turn cannot be understood independently from the  environment in
which they occur. They are always doings from a place to keep the organism in touch with some
environmental structure; the adjustments therefore depend on the organism and the environment,
which constrains how the organism can approach a surrounding object. After a routine of orienting
and exploratory adjustments of the perceptual organs is established in relation to a environmental
invariant, in a way in which responses of the organism to that particular invariant can be said to
resonate to it,  the organism is in the possession of a discriminatory skill or ability.11 Learning a
11 A history of interactions with an object or property is essential for the acquisition of a perceptual or discriminatory
skill. By those interactions an organism “can have  found out that this or that action was  actually afforded in the
past, and this can be the basis on which its current perception of its environment can have become sensitive to these
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discriminatory skill is a process of attunement through which the organism adapts to its environment,
giving rise to an organism-environment system. One consequence of this process is the great degree
of symmetry that arises between organismal states and environmental states (Shaw and McIntyre
1974,  p.  278).  For  instance,  through  the  orienting  and  adjusting  activities  that  constitute  a
discriminatory skill, the structure of an environmental invariant is reflected in a symmetrical flux of
stimulation of the organism attuned to that invariant. The reason, then, why a discriminatory skill can
be exercised only in its  proper environment is very simple.  Since its mechanism for picking up
information is a resonating one, which involves modulating the flux of stimuli to reflect or resonate
to an environmental invariant, this invariant must be present for the continuous adjustments of the
sense organs and body through which a discriminatory skill controls the flux of stimuli in order to
fulfill its aim. Motor feedback—the presence or absence of impediments—is then crucial for that
control. In a nutshell,  to resonate to its environment, the organism must be in that environment.
Similarly,  perception,  the  act  of  picking  up  information,  is  never  an  instantaneous  act  but  a
continuous act “of getting in closer touch with the environment” (Gibson and Gibson 1955, p. 34).
It may be objected that we have modeled discriminatory skills in the light of a resonating mechanism
because we assumed that perception is the act of picking up information. A weaker assumption—that
perception is  the act  of  picking up information in general—would lead us  in  another  direction.
However, it’s clear to Gibson that the ecological approach to perception involves a redefinition of
perception  (Gibson 2015,  p.  228).  That  he has  intended to  define  perception  along these  lines,
making the strong claim that to perceive is  always the act of picking up an invariant, is clearly
expressed in  his  acknowledgment  that  his  theory  of  perception  cannot  be used to  “account  for
hallucination or delusions or, in fact, for any kind of maladjustment” (Gibson and Gibson 1955, p.
34). These phenomena are no less important for understanding the behavior of an organism, but they
environmental properties.” (Myin 2016, p. 99) Gibson also claims that “the pickup of information reinforces the
exploratory adjustments of the organs that make it possible” (1968, p. 271). 
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must be explained by “supplementary assumptions,” that is, “a theory of perception should certainly
allow for misperception, but it can hardily at the same time be a theory of misperception” (Gibson
1968, p. 287). Misperception can occur because the information available is inadequate—it is not
sufficient for specifying an environmental invariant—or even when it is adequate, because it is not
picked up (Gisbon 2015, p. 233). In either case the definition of perception is not satisfied. Let us
examine each of these cases.
Take the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion. It consists of two parallel lines, one of which ends  in
inward pointing arrows, the other which ends with outward pointing arrows. The latter line appears
to be bigger than the former. This case is supposed to be an illusion because the lines have the same
length, whereas we have an experience of the lines as having different lengths. However, we are
assuming that one line isolated from other cues constitutes information for the length of the line. This
assumption is rejected by Gibson: He points out that the “stimulus information for the length of a
line is altered by combining it with other lines” (Gibson 1968, p. 303). Given the environment in
which we live, the first line contains partial information for the ridge of a roof seen from below,
while the second line contains partial information for the ridge of a roof seen from above. Thus,
given the information conveyed by these lines in normal situations, it is not surprising that one line
appears to be bigger than the other. In fact, this is reason for not treating this figure as a paradigmatic
case of illusion. If our criterion of reality is not the length of the line in the retinal image, as it was
assumed  by the  traditional  psychologist  (Michaels  & Carello  1981,  p.  91),  but  the  information
conveyed by the combinations of lines, then, according to projective geometry, the lines appear as
they should. In any case, this is an episode of misperception, because it is a case of picking up a
partial information for an invariant instead of an invariant itself. Notice that the Müller-Lyer drawing
cannot be explored and focused from different perspectives in the same way in which the lines
composing the  shape  of  the  ridge  could  be  explored  and focused by a  moving organism.  Any
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invariant related to the length of the ridge that could be picked up by a moving organism is not
available  in  the  Müller-Lyer  drawing:  Partial  information  is  being  mistaken  for  the  complete
information about an invariant. It is not a case of perception, since perception is the act of picking up
invariants instead of ambiguous or incomplete information. In fact, many so-called optical illusions
are cases of picking up incomplete information. In this respect, it is interesting to notice that in some
situations of insufficient information, it is not uncommon that the perceptual system keeps trying to
reach additional information by launching more exploratory activities and adjustments of the sense
organs (Gibson 1968, p. 303). 
There are other situations in which an invariant is present in the environment, but the organism may
be unable to pick it up. This can happen for many reasons, by failure of organ adjustment at high
intensity stimulation,  physiological  after-effects,  over-selective attention,  after-effects  habituation,
etc. (Gibson 1968, pp. 304–310). For instance, at very high levels of illumination, such as when one
is looking directly at the sun, the intensity of the light is too great to be registered by the human eye’s
photoreceptors. Invariants specifying a flying bird can be present but may not be picked up in this
situation. Another case of deficiency of the perceptual process is that of afterimages, which are due
to the way the retinal photoreceptors work. After being over-stimulated for a long period of time by
uninterrupted light, photoreceptors adapt to the stimulation by losing sensibility. Then, for a brief
period after the interruption of stimulation, the photoreceptors continue to be excited, yielding a
sensation of a patch of color in whatever direction one looks. Afterimages may distract attention and
affect the process of picking up invariants, but normally they do not impede that process, requiring
more effort from the organism to compensate their distracting effect (Gibson 1968, p. 306).
It may be argued that Gibson is making an arbitrary move by defining perception in the way he does.
The nature of perception, the argument goes, rather than being decided by definition, is something
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we should discover by doing experiments. However, what must be assessed empirically is Gibson’s
theory as a whole, not particular bits of it. Furthermore, his procedure is a very common one in every
scientific corner, as is well illustrated by Duhem’s discussion about the definition of free fall. Free
fall is defined as uniformly accelerated motion, wherein acceleration is constant and directed to the
center of the Earth. If we observe the fall of a heavy object and notice that this object does not fall in
accordance with that definition, we should not then dismiss the definition, but instead conclude that
the object does not fall freely. In this situation, it must be assumed that some force, which then
should be  investigated and classified,  have intervened to prevent  the object  from falling  freely.
Definitions that are fundamental for a scientific theory “cannot be contradicted by any experiment”
(Duhem 1991, p. 208); rather, they set up the framework of a research program. A definition and the
whole scientific framework revolving around it may be discarded only if the set of different causes
and forces assumed to explain diversions from the definition starts to become much too complex and
to generate theoretical difficulties rather than solutions and explanations. In Kuhnian terms, this may
be the moment for a paradigm shift or scientific revolution (Kuhn 2012). Similar considerations
apply to Gibson’s approach to perception. If we observe an organism trying to pick up an invariant
and notice that it  fails to do so, or if we observe that an organism behaves as if  there were an
invariant  that  is  not  present  in  the  surrounding  environment,  we  should  not  dismiss  Gibson’s
definition of perception, but instead conclude that these situations involve cases of misperception,
that some cause must have intervened to prevent the organism from fully exercising a discriminatory
skill. Insofar as Gibson’s whole theoretical framework shows itself to be fruitful, there is no reason
to reject his definition.
4. Disjunctivism and ecological psychology
Disjunctivism can be characterized by the rejection of the following assumption that, following
McDowell (1982, p. 471), can be called the highest common factor assumption:
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Subjects who on seeing X/an F/something G have an experience such that it looks to them just as if
X/an F/something G is there could have the very same experience if they were merely hallucinating
X/an F/something G. (Millar 2016, p. 177) 
Thus, while the traditional view claims that seeing an X and hallucinating an X involve the same
type of experience, which could be described by a looks statement such as “It looks to S as if there
is an X,” the disjunctivist view sustains that these episodes involve different types of experience at a
fundamental level, and that that look claim should rather be analyzed as stating a disjunction such
as “S sees an X or she is having the hallucination of an X.”12 This does not mean that according to
disjunctivism those experiences could not have anything in common. Even if they did, this would
not turn them in experiences of the same type, at least not at a relevant explanatory level. 
To avoid misunderstandings, it is important to clarify the connection between the ordinary usage of
perceptual verbs such as “see”, “hear”, and “perceive” and what is claimed by disjunctivism. It is
often acknowledged that perceptual verbs are primarily verbs of success or, as Ryle puts it, “verbs
part of the business of which is to declare a terminus” (1954, p. 102-3). Perceptual verbs indicate
the successful terminus of a process of detection or discrimination; for example, the verb “win” in
the sentence “John won the race” indicates that John was successful in reaching the end of the race
first. Analogously, the sentence “John sees that bird” does not indicate that John's eyes are directed
toward a place where a bird can be found but that John has successfully detected or discriminated
the bird from its surrounding. According to this usage, success verbs do not describe processes, they
manifest an achievement. I can, in fact, “be looking for or looking at something, but I cannot be
12 John Hinton was probably the first philosopher to explicitly propose this kind of analysis for looks claims (Hinton
1967) and to suggest that we are not obliged to accept that there is a common element, a shared inner experience, to
perceptual and illusory experiences (1967, p. 223). As to whether naïve realists, who had also endorsed before
Hinton that there are two types of experience in the appropriate sense, should count as disjunctivists or not is an
open issue (Snowdon 2008. p. 40).  
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seeing it. At any given moment either I have not yet seen it or I have now seen it” (Ryle 1954, p.
103).  Of course,  perceptual  verbs can also be used in situations that  do not involve successful
detection  or  discrimination.  We  commonly  use  these  verbs  to  describe  dreams  or  episodes  of
hallucination; this use is not inherently problematic, provided we keep in mind that these are not
cases of  successful detection or discrimination.  In these occasions,  we are just  describing how
things look or appear to us. Let us call this usage of perceptual verbs the “non-success usage” and
the former one the “success usage”. Thus, it is correct to say that the disjunction “S sees an X or she
is having the hallucination of an X” captures, in a more perspicuous way, the ordinary distinction
between the success and non-success usage of perceptual verbs. It is not a novelty that disjunctivists
tend to present their  view as articulating common-sense ideas (Pritchard 2015, p. 6; McDowell
1996, p. 113; Millar 2016, p. 63). However, it would be wrong to conclude that disjunctivism is
nothing more than the ratification of  that  distinction.  For one thing,  non-disjunctivists  are  also
perfectly comfortable with that distinction. The point at which disjunctivists and their opponents
disagree is how to explain this distinction. The latter group posits that the difference between the
success and non-success usage of perceptual verbs has nothing to do with agent’s experiences.13 The
presence,  in  a successful case,  and the absence,  in a  non-successful  case,  of the object  seen is
completely extrinsic to the agent’s experiences. Thus, the assumption of the highest common factor
is  open to them. For the former,  on the contrary,  the difference is  intrinsic  to experience.  In a
successful case,  our experience involves the object present,  in fact,  one sees the object present
because one’s perceptual experience discloses it, whereas, in a non-successful case, our experience
does  not  involve  any  environmental  object.  Therefore,  an  episode  of  perception  and  the
corresponding episode of hallucination are fundamentally different types of experience. Perceptual
experience is world-involving, according to the disjunctivist.
13 This case is usually referred to as metaphysical disjunctivism; disjunctivism about the nature of experience. Others
prefer to explain the difference between the successful and non-successful usage of perceptual verbs in relation to
the epistemic warrant that experience can provide, which is usually referred to as epistemic disjunctivism. For an
introduction to varieties of disjunctivism, see Haddock and Macpherson (2008).
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Gibson’s  view of  perception  is  in  agreement  with  the  rejection  of  the  highest  common factor
assumption: 
 
There can be direct  or  immediate awareness of objects and events when the perceptual systems
resonate so as to pick up information and there can be a kind of direct or immediate awareness of the
psychological states of our sense organs when the sensory nerves as such are excited. But these two
kinds of experience should not be confused, for they are at opposite poles, objective and subjective.
Only the former should be called perceptual experience. (Gibson 1967, p. 168)
As was  shown in  the  last  section,  according  to  ecological  psychology  there  is  a  fundamental
asymmetry between the exercise of a discriminatory skill, which yields a case of perception, and the
failure to exercise that skill, which yields a case of misperception. There is no highest common
factor being shared by these cases. In a case of perception, the organism picks up an invariant and is
aware of something in its surrounding environment (Gibson 2015, p. 244), whereas in a case of
misperception either no invariant is picked up or an insufficient information is picked up; in both
cases the organism is not aware of something in its surrounding environment, even though it may
have all sorts of sensations. Thus, cases of perception and cases of misperception are different, and
this difference is warrant enough to motivate disjunctivism about the nature of experience. Further,
as picking up information is to perceive directly the source of that information, perception is also
world-involving according to the ecological approach. 
A common theme amongst those who articulate a version of disjunctivism is that the exercise of our
perceptual skills or abilities should not be construed as mere reactions to objects in the environment,
nor simply as “a matter of my being affected in certain ways as a result of the presence” (Millar
2016, p. 191) of certain objects in the environment. On the contrary, the exercise of a perceptual
20
skill should be construed as active, as something an agent does (Noë 2004, p. 1) and therefore as
something that can be done intelligently. This is because perceptual skills are, as claimed before,
skills acquired by learning and attributable to agents. It’s the organism as a whole who learns to
discriminate. These skills have the function of “enabling access to what there is” (Noë 2015, p. 2),
of  providing “openness  to  the world” (McDowell  1996,  p.  111)  or  of  putting us  “in cognitive
contact with objects  or facts” (Millar 2016, p.  194).  Thus, the exercise of a perceptual skill  or
ability, by putting us in cognitive contact with an object or by providing responsive access to its
presence, results in the acquisition of knowledge. When something goes wrong, maybe because one
finds  oneself  in  an  inadequate  environment  or  maybe  because  some enabling  condition  is  not
present, despite the attempt to exercise a perceptual skill, none is actually exercised; in this case no
perceptual  knowledge  is  acquired.  This  view  explains  well  why  perceptual  experience  and
hallucinatory  experience  have  different  natures.  The  former  is  generated  by  the  exercise  of  a
perceptual skill which successfully puts the agent in cognitive contact with some object or event in
her environment, the resulting perceptual experience involves the awareness of that object or event,
whereas the latter is a failed attempt to establish that contact, the agent is aware of no object in her
environment in virtue of her hallucinatory experience.   
This description of perceptual abilities as acquired skills fits well with Gibson’s view of perception.
I’ve already quoted  Gibson’s  claim that  “perceptual  systems develop perceptual  skills”  (Gibson
1968, p. 51) by a process of attunement to an invariant. In fact,  “a perceptual system is altered when
it is attuned to information of a certain sort. The system has become sensitized. Differences are
noticed that were previously not noticed” (Gibson 2015, p. 243). Becoming attuned to information
is the same as acquiring a skill of access to the object or event specified by that information. In line
with the above construal of perceptual skills, “the theory of information pickup makes a clear-cut
separation between perception and fantasy, but it closes the supposed gap between perception and
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knowledge” (Gibson 2105, p. 246). Thus, there is a perfect match between the ecological view of
perception and the disjunctivist construal of perceptual skills. 
In the previous section, I claimed that,  according to the ecological view of perception, perceptual
skills  can  only  be  exercised  in  a  proper  environment.  One  may  wonder  whether  disjunctivism
supports this claim. On this matter, there is no consensus. McDowell, for example, accepts that there
may be defective exercises of perceptual abilities (2011, p. 38). According to him, fallibility should
be applied to abilities or capacities, “there can be exercises of the capacity in which its possessor
does not do what the capacity is specified as a capacity to do” (2011, p. 37). Alan Millar thinks
differently; fallibility should be applied to the attempts at exercising an ability. According to him, the
manifestation of a skill or an ability is a notion of success (Millar 2009, p. 224), the manifestation is
the subject’s fulfilling the function of that ability. One may be said to have attempted to exercise an
ability, but if the ability’s function has not been fulfilled, one did not exercise it. He contends that
this construal of perceptual skills is necessary to explain how cognitive contact is achievable. If one
assumes that perceptual skills provide cognitive contact with surrounding objects, then the skills “in
question are individuated in such a way that they do not count as being exercised unless knowledge
is  acquired” (Millar  2007,  p.  194).14 The details  of  this  transcendental  argument  about  what  is
required to secure cognitive contact are not important here. The relevant point is the match between
the ecological and Millar’s disjunctivist construal of perceptual skills. On one hand, this increases
the validity of examining the epistemological consequences of the ecological view of perception in
14 It may be objected that some performances are so difficult that even someone highly skilled in completing the
performance will not succeed every time she tries to exercise that skill. This is the case, for instance, of chicken
sexing.  Even  the  most  skilled  in  this  task  will,  at  best,  classify  1,000  chicks  per  hour  with  98%  accuracy
(Biederman and Shiffrar 1987, p. 640). This seems to challenge the assumption that all exercises of a skill must be
successful. It would be odd to say that these people only exercise the skill 98% of the time but fail to exercise it in
the other 2% of the time. In cases such as this one, we require, as Millar points out, the notion of a success-rate
ability (2016, p. 70). A chicken sexer who has the ability to classify 1,000 chicks per hour with 98% accuracy will
succeed in classifying with 98% accuracy every, or even nearly every, time she exercises her success-rate ability
during the course of a 1,000-chick sequence. Again, abilities or skills are individuated in such a way to preserve the
connection between exercise and success.
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the light of disjunctivism. On the other hand, Millar’s version of disjunctivism may be backed up by
a scientific view of perception. 
What is the kind of knowledge acquired by the exercise of a perceptual skill? As perceptual abilities
are developed or acquired skills, provided that the function of putting us in cognitive contact with
objects  or facts  is  fulfilled,  there is  a wide range of possibilities:  From practical knowledge to
objectual knowledge to propositional knowledge. In line with the ecological view of perception, I
submit  that  perceptual  or  discriminatory  skills  provide  primarily  practical  knowledge.15 The
knowledge  obtained  by  the  exercise  of  perceptual  skills  is  knowledge  of  affordances,  that  is,
knowledge of how to deal with surrounding objects and events to satisfy the organism’s practical
needs. The possession of discriminatory skills opens up to the organism what may be called a space
of  possibilities  for  actions,  in  allusion  to  Sellars’  logical  space  of  reasons  (Sellars  1991).
Discriminatory skills carry a particular type of intelligibility of the world, namely, a practical mode
of understanding (Noë 2015, p. 3).16 In this sense, to have perceptual knowledge of an object is not
only to be aware of that object but mainly,  depending on the task,  to be aware of some of its
possibilities for action and to be prepared to enact them. All that is necessary for an organism to
possess practical knowledge regarding an object in its environment is that the organism is able to
keep  its  cognitive  contact  with  that  object  through  its  discriminatory  skills,  which,  remember,
15 It’s  perfectly  doable  to  conceive,  as  McDowell  does  (1996,  2011),  perceptual  skills  as  involving  conceptual
resources from the beginning and then to sustain that the exercise of these conceptual-perceptual skills provides
propositional knowledge. This is not the path I’m following, at least if it is assumed that concepts are context-
independent entities that satisfy Evans’ generality constraint (EVANS 1982, p. 104) and structure propositional
thought. As is strongly suggested by ecological psychology, non-conceptual perceptual skills can be acquired much
before we are able to acquire conceptual-perceptual skills, and this is something that we share with animals. The
ecological  approach,  as  Turvey  et  al.  emphasize,  “is  concerned  with  the  perceiving  that  goes  with  acting”
(TURVEY et al. 1981, p. 240) or with how perception serves to guide and control action, whereas the traditional
approach  to  perception  is  concerned  with  the  fixation  of  perceptual  beliefs.  Gibson  is  focused  on  low-level
phenomena.  Besides,  as  Dreyfus  suggests,  we  should  try  to  explain  how the  “upper  stories  of  the  edifice  of
knowledge” (2006, p. 48)—such as perceptual beliefs—rest upon the non-linguistic coping going on on the ground
floor. This requires first a good understanding of what is going on on the ground floor. 
16 In the view presented here, objects are not purely given to us in perception, they are intelligibly apprehended and
structured in the space of possibilities for action. Perception, as we have been pointing, is not passive but active, it
involves the employment of agent’s discriminatory skills. Thus, Sellars’ charge that a pure given cannot be an
episode of knowledge (Sellars 1991, pp. 127–134) does not apply to the view presented here.
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involve exploratory activities. Perception, then, is something we do (Myin 2016, p. 99). To see an
apple, for instance, is to perceive its affordances, is to know how to keep it in view, to reach it, to
manipulate  it,  among  other  things.  I  call  this  view of  perceptual  skills  or  abilities  ecological
disjunctivism. 
5. Ecological disjunctivism and the distinguishability problem
If it’s agreed that a case of perception and its corresponding case of hallucination are subjectively
indistinguishable  (McDowell  1996,  p.  112)  (Pritchard  2012,  p.  20),  then,  even  if  these  cases
represent different kinds of experience, as disjunctivism claims, it may be argued that one can never
know whether one is perceiving or not. If the basis for distinguishing one case from the other is by
introspecting their phenomenal qualities, then it seems there is no way to distinguish between a case
of perception and its  corresponding case of hallucination.  As the argument goes,  if  one cannot
distinguish one case from the other, then one cannot know one is perceiving and, therefore, obtain
knowledge about the world through perception. This is the distinguishability problem. The openness
to the world promised by disjunctivism would not be enough to secure knowledge of the world. 
First, notice that we are traditionally invited to imagine a perceiver in a stationary situation looking
at  a  particular  object  and  then  to  conceive  the  possibility  of  that  perceiver  having  the  same
experience in a situation of hallucination. If we assume the snapshot view of perception, it is not a
surprise that we must allow the possibility and even the existence of many pairs of indistinguishable
episodes of perception and hallucination. However, if we assume Gibson’s view of perception and
understand  that  perception  occurs  over  time  through  the  exercise  of  discriminatory  skills  that
usually require movements of the eyes, head, and body to pick up invariants in the environment, it
is then disputable whether we need to allow the existence and even the possibility of these pairs of
cases.  To know whether  you are  looking at  a  barn  facade or  an actual  barn,  you need just  to
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approach it laterally and pick up the invariant for a flat surface or the invariant for the depth of a
barn. That you in a stationary position are unable to tell one from the other if they are centered in
your visual field is not an indication of any discriminatory limitation of your perceptual system.
Discriminatory skills are not supposed to be exercised without requiring some sort of exploratory
activity. Besides, picking up the invariant for a flat surface is different from picking up the invariant
for the depth of a barn; the exploratory activities involved in these acts of perception are not the
same.
But then it may be argued that the same flux of stimulation that is obtained by exploring a real barn
could also be obtained by stimulating our sense organs over time in a similar manner, yielding then
a  corresponding  case  of  hallucination.  Hallucination  would  happen  over  time  as  much  as
perception. This worry, however, ignores the constitutive connection between discriminatory skills
and exploratory activities. The perceptual system is not passive in relation to the flux of stimulation,
it’s active in exploring and generating it.  The process of picking up an invariant in the flux of
stimulation, the exercise of a discriminatory skill, depends on the fact that this flux is under the
control of the organism in the sense that the flux changes over time due to exploratory activities of
the organism. The perceptual systems is not insensitive to feedback input from the motor system. To
see the importance of this point, let’s take the case of afterimages first. They cannot be “explorable,
or investigable or susceptible to increased clarity by sense-organ adjustments” (Gibson 1970, p.
426), there is no way to approach to or recede from or focus on an afterimage. What cannot be
explored by the adjustments of sense-organs cannot be perceived. Thus, afterimages cannot be the
object of an episode of perception. We can, of course, have an afterimage of a star in the sense that
we have sensations that are similar in some respects to the experience of seeing a star,  but we
cannot, according to the ecological approach to perception, perceive them. As Gibson points out, the
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brain  “alone  can  generate  experience  of  a  sort.  What  it  cannot  do  is  to  generate  perceptual
experience” (Gibson 1970, p. 426). 
Gibson devised a test of reality for distinguishing cases of perception from cases of imagining,
dreaming, or hallucination based on the connection between discriminatory skills and exploratory
activities. His criterion is as follows: 
Whenever adjustment of the perceptual organs yields a corresponding change of stimulation there
exists  an  external  source  of  stimulation  and  one  is  perceiving.  Whenever  adjustment  of  the
perceptual organs yields no corresponding change of stimulation there exists no external source of
stimulation and one is imagining, dreaming or hallucinating. (Gibson 1970, p. 426)
The motor input is,  thus, crucial for the perceptual system. Let’s  take the barn case again. The
perceptual system distinguishes the visual flux of stimulation caused by the real barn from the
visual flux of stimulation caused by some neurological disturbance based on motor information.
While exploring a barn, the organism needs to adjust its perceptual organs in order to maintain the
barn in focus or to obtain a clearer view of it. These adjustments are followed by changes in the flux
of stimulation. In a similar way, reversing movements yields a corresponding change of stimulation.
For instance, moving toward the barn can be reversed by moving away from it. The stimulus flux
reverses  correspondingly.  Besides  this  causal  relation  between  adjustments  performed  by  the
organism and changes in the stimulation, another criteria for reality “is whether you can discover
new features and details by the act of scrutiny” (Gibson 2015, p. 245). I can discover a hole in one
of the walls of the barn by inspecting it while I get closer to it. Notice that a causal relation is also
implied in this case. A new “property” may pop up in an hallucinatory experience but not as an
outcome of activities of scrutiny.  Thus, the flux of stimulation that is obtained by exploring an
environmental object, like a real barn, is not the same as when one is having a “corresponding”
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hallucination.17 The former is a controlled flux but not the latter.18 This distinction is made by the
perceptual system itself; as is suggested by Gibson, “reliable and automatic tests for reality are
involved in the working of a perceptual system.” (Gibson 2015, p. 245)19
However,  it  may  be  argued  that  the  distinguishability  problem poses  a  question  that  must  be
answered in a first-person perspective. The question is whether an agent, not its perceptual system,
distinguishes between perception and hallucination. The claim of pairs of indistinguishable cases of
perception  and  hallucination  is  meant  to  be  understood  in  the  specific  situation  in  which  the
organism (the agent) is confined to its own sensations available at the present moment and then is
asked to tell those cases apart. In response to that challenge, the first thing to point out is that even if
it  were  granted  that  the  task  of  distinguishing  between  cases  of  perception  from  cases  of
hallucinations  should  be  addressed  by  appeal  to  sensations  only,  it  would  not  follow  that  an
organism unable to accomplish this task on that basis cannot have perceptual knowledge of any sort.
This is because, in the view presented here, the exercise of discriminatory skills, which can only
happen in the proper environment, is sufficient to yield perceptual knowledge. No intellectualist
17 Beaton, relying on the sensorimotor theory of perception, advanced a very similar approach to how perceptions are
distinguished from hallucinations and illusions. According to him, we should look at the similarities and differences
between “actions an agent  would take (if  appropriately tested)  when imagining (or hallucinating or  having an
illusion of or dreaming about) a given object (or property, etc.) and when actually perceiving such an object.”
(2016, p. 271) This is very close to Gibson’s point outlined above about the different effects of adjusting the sense
organs when perceiving and when imagining, dreaming or hallucinating. 
18 In a  classical study with newborn kittens, Held and Hein (1963) gathered evidence on the importance of motor
feedback for acquiring spatial notions. In their experiment, a group of kittens were allowed to move around a
cylinder  with  vertical  strips.  A second  group  of  kittens  were  exposed  to  the  same  stimuli,  not  by  their  own
movements, but by a device that moved them around the cylinder. By mechanical linkages to the gondola attached
to the active kittens, this device was able to mimic the movements of these kittens (1963, p. 873). Thus, both groups
were exposed to the same visual stimulus flux. However, only kittens from the first group learned to navigate and
move in the setting, while the kittens from the second group remained incapable to orientate in space.  
19 These considerations might not be sufficient to deal with the case of a virtual reality that is controlled by one’s
movements. I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for having pointed this out. This is a topic that raises
many issues and would require much more space than I have to address them. However, I will make two comments
about this case. First, many existing systems of virtual reality produce experiences that are distinguishable from our
normal perceptions. This is because these systems are not so responsive to movements as our perceptual system is.
Second, in the limiting case where a virtual reality system would produce over time a virtual reality that resembles
our non-virtual reality, including the relations between movements and changes in experience, I would be inclined
to claim that an agent equipped with the proper skills can perceive in this virtual reality, and that this reality is real
after all. I would have then to commit to a view of reality that comes in degree, having our non-virtual reality as the
limiting case,  but  this is  a  discussion for another paper.  For a  response to this objection from a sensorimotor
approach, see Noë (2004, p. 224-225). 
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condition, such as being able to place a perceptual episode in the space of reasons, is necessary for
perceptual knowledge. If the distinguishability problem makes this assumption about knowledge,
namely, that an episode can be a state of knowledge only if the agent is able to place it in the space
of reasons, then so much worse for the problem. 
Nevertheless,  we  may  consider  what  it  would  look  like  for  an  agent  to  have  second-order
knowledge, more specifically introspective knowledge of one’s experiential states, in the approach
developed here. The second point, then, is that introspection, although it is a system distinct from
perception, should be conceived as a skill  as well—say, the skill for distinguishing episodes of
perception from episodes of imagination, dreaming, and hallucination—and as such it can only be
exercised in a proper environment and under certain conditions. At first glance, there is no reason
why we should restrict  the input  for such skill  or  ability  to  sensations  available  at  the present
moment. Taking into consideration Gibson's test for reality, information about the adjustments of
the  perceptual  organs  delivered  by  proprioception  may  also  be  accessible  to  the  agent’s
introspection. It may be the case that we need to learn to introspect as much as we need to learn to
perceive and that introspection cannot be exercised in some situations, such as when the organism is
dreaming, because the information necessary for exercising introspection is not available to the
organism. Eventually, we may have to conclude that introspection is best conceived disjunctively in
the  same  way  as  perception.  In  that  case,  it  would  be  impossible  to  distinguish  episodes  of
perception from other types of episode in some situations, but this is no barrier to the possibility of
introspective  knowledge  in  the  case  that  the  environment  and  the  conditions  are  good for  the
exercise  of  such  introspective  skill,  such  as  when  the  organism  is  awake  and  has  access  to
information delivered by proprioception. In the proper conditions and environment, the exercise of
this skill would yield introspective knowledge of the type of the episode one is having. The fact that
this skill does not operate only upon sensations does not preclude it from yielding knowledge in the
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first-person perspective. It is not the aim of this paper to spell out the details of how such ability
would work; for our purposes, it is enough to outline its general shape.
According to the view of skills as environment-dependent, there is no reason to grant that there can
be pairs of indistinguishable episodes of perception and hallucination, even if we limit ourselves to
the first-person perspective. On the contrary, as these episodes differ in nature, we have reason to
think that  it  is  perfectly  possible  for  an organism to have or  acquire  a  skill  that  explores  that
difference  in  order  to  tell  those  episodes  apart  in  the  first-person  perspective.  Thus,  the
distinguishability problem can easily be addressed by an organism with the appropriate skills. The
problem seems to be a hard one only if we think that in the first-person perspective the organism
has access to nothing more than its present sensations. However, why should we limit in that way
the resources available to the organism in the first-person perspective? We should, rather, accept
deliverances from any first-person skill20 working in proper conditions as legitimate starting points
upon which new skills can rest.
Assuming the possibility of such introspective skill,  what the organism gains by exercising this
introspective ability is knowledge of affordances of its own mental episodes. In a recent paper, Tom
McClelland spelled out the workings of such introspective skill (McClelland 2015) in more detail,
extending the notion of affordances for that purpose. Although Gibson introduced the notion of
affordance as mainly applicable to environmental objects and events, there is no reason for not
allowing it to encompass affordances of mental states as well; that is, the possibilities for actions
that mental states offer. These possibilities for action do not necessarily require bodily movements
—they can be in a broad sense actions of a mental sort. Typical mental actions comprise attending,
20 This raises the issue of what constitutes a first-person skill. Following Lynne Rudder Baker, we can say that a first-
person skill or ability must exhibit the marks of consciousness and intentionality or self-consciousness. As to the
first  disjunct, which interests us here,  the skill  must be one by which the organism interacts “consciously and
intentionally  with  the  environment”  (Baker  2013,  p.  172).  As  we  have  been  arguing,  consciousness  and
intentionality are not instantiated only by awareness of sensations. Perceptual discriminatory skills exhibit equally
the marks of consciousness and intentionality by making us aware of environmental invariants.
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expecting,  evaluating,  deciding,  calculating,  imagining,  and  judging.  A  perceptual  state,  for
instance, in some situations, may afford a decision to perform an action, whereas a hallucination
may afford a decision to not perform that action. The details do not matter here; the main point is
that the introspective skill outlined above, in the proper environment and conditions, can make it
possible to distinguish perceptual episodes from hallucinatory episodes, offering the organism a
richer  repertory  of  possibilities  for  action.  Thus,  in  the  view  developed  here,  one  can  have
perceptual  knowledge  of  the  affordances  of  an  object  and  introspective  knowledge  of  the
affordances of that episode of perceptual knowledge. I submit that it is an interesting consequence
of the way skills and abilities were suggested to be construed here that there may be second-order
practical knowledge. It would be interesting to investigate what this view of discriminatory skills
indicates about the difference between the perception of affordances of a particular in opposition to
affordances  of  a  type  of  particular—that  is,  how  the  view  deals  with  perceptual  particularity
(Schellenberg 2016). 
Concluding Remarks
According to the view developed in this paper, discriminatory skills can be exercised only in their
proper environment. We can understand this conclusion by construing discriminatory skills through
the radio metaphor. Discrimination is a resonating process through which an organism’s perceptual
systems  become  attuned  to  invariants.  The  exercise  of  perceptual  skills  gives  us  perceptual
knowledge of affordances, that is, knowledge of how to deal with surrounding objects and events
for the satisfaction of our needs and projects. The failure to exercise a discriminatory skill, which is
same as the failure to pick up information, yields an episode of misperception. Thus, perception and
misperception are different in nature. The ecological and disjunctivist views of perception are well-
suited  to  one  another.  Disjunctivism  benefits  from  the  scientific  credentials  of  ecological
psychology, while ecological psychology benefits from the epistemological framework provided by
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disjunctivism. One consequence of the proposed way of construing perceptual  skills  is  that the
distinguishability  problem  can  be  easily  addressed.  Even  a  lasting  hallucinatory  experience  is
distinguishable from a corresponding perceptual experience because the former does not result from
a controlled flux of stimulation, whereas the latter does. This motor difference may also be the basis
for  an  introspective  skill  to  discriminate  between  affordances  of  episodes  of  perception  and
affordances of episodes of hallucination.
Acknowledgments I  would  like  to  thank  the  two  anonymous  reviewers  for  their  valuable
suggestions and critical feedback on this manuscript.
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